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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
TROY 0. NANCE, and 
TI-IO~IAS B. HANLEY, 
vs. 
Plaintiffs and Respondents 
and Cross-Appellants, 
SHEET l\IETAL WORKERS 
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION, 
an unincorporated association, 
Defendant and AppeZZ:ant. 
Case 
No. 9111 
Reply and Answer Brief 
For Defendant and Appellant 
REPLY TO PLAINTIFFS' STATEMENT OF FACTS 
It is needless to point out each precise area of disagree-
ment between the parties with respect to the facts. We do 
not agree entirely ·with plaintiffs' statement of facts and 
will point out briefly some of the new matter that is in-
accurately stated in their recitation. 
I. 
At page 2 of plaintiffs' brief, they state that the first 
phase of the case (tried to the court sitting without a jury) 
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"related to the legality of the expulsion, the right to re-
cover exenLplary damages and attorneys fees.'' With re-
spect to the right to recover exemplary damages and at-
torneys fees, the record shows the following significant 
stipulation of counsel with the court (Pre-T., 9-5-58, 1) : 
''THE COURT: The record will show as to No. 
3783, set for trial October 6, 1958, that the trial will be 
proceeded with without empaneling a jury, on the mat-
ter of whether the expulsion of the petitioner and the 
intervenor was or was not wrongful, and that will be 
decided by the court without a jury; that if the court 
finds that the expulsion was wrongful in either case, 
then the case would be consolidated with No. 3784 upon 
the question of the petitioner's or the intervenor's 
damages and the jury would be called upon to render 
a verdict upon the issue of the amount of damages. 
'' }.IR. FISHER: It will also be understood that 
the trial in 3784 in any event will commence immedi-
ately after the trial in 3783? 
"THE COURT: The court proposes to set the 
trial of case 3784 to follow in1mediately upon comple-
tion of the trial of 3783 before the court upon the issue 
of the expulsion of the petitioner and the inte1Tenor. 
and the record may show that counsel on each side 
consent to that method of procedure. 
"l\IR. _l\rcCUNE: \Ye so stipulate. 
"1\fR. SANDACK: \Y e would so stipulate.'· 
The entire first phase of this case wa~ tried precisely in 
accordance with this stipulation. 
It was not until the first phase of the case had been 
concluded and the court had announced its decision finding 
the expulsions were void that the court, in its Order of Jan-
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uary 21, 1959, unilaterally set aside this stipulation and de-
cided that not all of the damage issues would be thrown to 
the jury. This action by the court was in derogation of 
the stipulation and was done over vigorous protest on the 
part of counsel for the union as earlier discussed in our 
opening brief. 
1'Ioreover, it is erroneous to state that, "* * * the court 
postponed decision [on December 30, 1958, or January 9, 
1959] on the issues whether the defendant had acted wrong-
fully and maliciously and whether, as a consequence there-
of, plaintiffs were entitled to recover punitive and exem-
plary damag·es and attorneys fees pending the trial of the 
issues to be tried before the jury.'' Reference to plain-
tiffs' appendix, pages 9 through 12, shows that the court. 
at those times, made absolutely no reservation of any dam-
age issues to be decided by the court alone. The court had 
no intention of adjudicating any damage issues (whether 
compensatory, nominal or punitive) until its sudden change 
of position announced January 21, 1959, in its ''Order as 
to Issues to be Submitted to Jury." 
II. 
Plaintiffs' comments at pages 6 and 7 of their brief, 
imputing to defendant sole responsibility for the length 
of trial, appear to be uncalled for. The prolixity of the trial 
both before the court and before the jury was certainly not 
the result of any plan on the part of counsel for the union. 
The damage claims alone approximated nearly one-half 
million dollars. The alleged activities covered the years 
1954 up to the time of trial in 1958 and involved conduct 
alleged to have taken place inN evada, Arizona, California, 
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Utah, Montreal, Canada, Washington, D. C. and Miami, 
Florida. The trial court permitted plaintiffs and their 
witnesses to testify extensively as to hearsay reports and 
conversations, and defendant had the burden to bring int? 
court the essential proof and witnesses to refute the evi-
dence attributed to them. 
III. 
Under the heading, ''FACTS PRECEDING UNIOX 
CHARGES", pages 10 through 19, plaintiffs' brief, is a 
resume of the testimony most favorable to plaintiffs direct-
ed to the issue that union president Byron and other gen-
eral officers engaged in a conspiracy to oust and suppress 
Hanley and Nance of union membership on account of their 
advocacy of political resolutions. It should be noted that 
all of this testimony is refuted by witnesses who appeared 
for the union (see pages 46 and 4 7 of our opening brief), 
but we think the short answer, rather than detail such tes-
timony and burden this brief, is that the trial court did not 
credit plaintiffs' testimony on this conspiracy theory. 
The defendant previously has conceded that the trial 
court found that, in preferring charges against Hanley and 
Nance, President Byron was motivated in part at least by 
a wrongful desire to prevent them from promoting these 
resolutions; but the court further found that Byron also 
had received reports and information pertaining to aetiYi-
ties of Hanley and Nance which, if assumed to be true, 
would have given him probable cause to believe that the 
charges which he preferred, or at least some of them, were 
true. (See plaintiffs' appendix, page 23, parag-raph 12.) 
This does not constitute a finding that the charges were 
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illegal because they were preferred maliciously; nor was 
it a finding that President Byron acted improperly in pre-
ferring them. 
\Ve point out further that plaintiffs' insinuations at 
page 21 of their brief that Grant Stetter, the private investi-
gator employed by the union, conducted a biased investi-
gation of Hanley and Nance is not substantiated by any 
finding of the trial court. 
Likewise, there is no finding by the trial court that 
Vice President Fitzgerald, who was a member of the union 
trial board, or any other member of the union trial board, 
was hostile to or biased against plaintiffs (See p. 28, plain-
tiffs' brief). In fact, as was shown in our opening brief, 
the trial court's decision that plaintiffs' trials were void 
was based almost entirely on the premise that their trials 
should not have proceeded in absentia. That premise 
would have been wholly untenable if the court believed that 
the trial board would not have given them an impartial 
trial. 
Finally, the trial court made no finding that any mem-
ber of the union's Grievance and Appeals Committee at the 
~Iontreal Convention was hostile to or biased against Han-
ley and Nance or that any of such members were impor-
tuned by President Byron, any other general officer, or any 
other person, to deal prejudicially with the appeals of 
Hanley or Nance. 
REPLY TO POINT IA OF PLAINTIFFS' BRIEF 
Two statements made in plaintiffs' argument under 
Point IA fairly bring the crucial issue of this lawsuit into 
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focus. At page 52, they state, ''The responsibility for 
conducting orderly trials rested on the defendant and on 
the defendant alone", and at pag·e 55, "* * * their [Han-
ley's and Nance's] conduct was neither improper nor cen-
surable under the circumstances.'' 
In our opening brief, we pointed out that a labor union 
trial, as distinguished from a trial in a court of law, de-
pends almost entirely upon the willingness of the union 
member to submit himself in good faith before the trial 
board to stand trial in accordance with the rules of proce-
dure of that board. Without this willingness to comply, it 
would be absolutely impossible to conduct an orderly trial 
or hearing. A union trial board cannot compel compliance 
with its procedure by force. Thus, plaintiffs' statement 
that the responsibility for conducting orderly trials rests 
on the union is not only meaningless but undoubtedly false 
if by it they mean to say that the union has the sole duty to 
n1aintain order and, in fact, must maintain it despite an~­
thing that might happen at the trials. Such an impossible 
burden can not be cast upon the Union. All of the duty is 
not placed on the union; the persons accused also have an 
equally significant duty to conduct themselves properly at 
these trials and to refrain from disorder, disobedience, or 
contumacity. 
The ''open hearings'' on June 3, 4 and I were indeed 
a "shmn and farce", but the~~ became so on account of the 
inexcusable misconduct of :Messrs. Hanley and X ance and 
their cohorts, who contended that the~~ were willing to stand 
trial and ~Tet, h~T their conduct and design, refused to submit 
even to the preliminary orders for holding the trial and 
who thus prevented the trials fron1 e\·er commencing. 
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The initial procedural rules of the union trial board, 
namely: Exclusion from the trial room of witnesses, spec-
tators and newspaper reporters during the course of pro-
ceedings, were manifestly not unreasonable. The separa-
tion of witnesse~ rule has long been honored in the 
courts. There is no authority of which we are aware that 
requires private union trials to be open to the public. It 
was not the duty of the trial board to conduct trials under 
terms demanded by Hanley and Nance; rather, it was the 
duty of Hanley and Nance to comply with the trial board's 
rules of procedure, unless the same could be said to be so 
unreasonable that insistence upon them would be equiva-
lent to a denial of due process. 
But nothing we say here could convincingly demon-
~trate the merit of our position as well as a careful reading 
of the complete verbatim transcripts of the open hearings, 
contained in the appendix to our opening brief. These 
transcripts supply the answer to the crucial question of this 
lawsuit: Whether Hanley and Nance wrongfully refused to 
stand trial, or whether they were improperly denied a trial. 
REPLY TO POINT II OF PLAINTIFFS' BRIEF 
Plaintiffs contend that the trial court found that 
their expulsions were also independently illegal on the 
ground that the proceedings were malicious. We under-
stand this contention to mean that even if the trial court 
had held that the expulsion proceedings were not violative 
of due process of law, the court nevertheless would have 
held the expulsions to be null and void on account of mali-
cious motives harbored by a few of defendant union's offi-
cials. There is no support for this proposition in any of 
7 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the memoranda issued by the trial court or in its Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and final Judgment. It is 
clear, as we pointed out in our opening brief, that the only 
ground upon which the expulsions were ruled invalid was 
denial of due process. The findings of the court pertain-
ing to malice are directed exclusively to the proposition 
that if it can be shown that illegal proceedings are also 
tainted with malice, a right to recover exemplary damages 
therefor may lie. 
We attempted, moreover, in our opening brief, to dem-
onstrate that Judge Hoyt erred in finding that the expul-
sions were even partially motivated by malice. We further 
pointed out that the inference that President Byron was 
motivated by a proper objective in preferring the charges 
against the plaintiffs is distinctly stronger than the infer-
ence that he was maliciously motivated. In this connection, 
counsel for plaintiffs properly point out in their brief 
that the case of N.L.R.B. v. Huber & Huber }fotor Exp., 
223 F. 2d 748 (C.A. '5th 1955), which was cited at page 47 
of our opening brief, was overruled in the subsequent deci-
sion of N.L.R.B. v. Fox Manufactu,ring Co .. 238 F. 2d 211 
( C.A. 5th 1956). It is fair to state, however, that the Fifth 
Circuit overruled this case only because of the requirement 
of the National Labor Relations Act that, upon review, a 
decision of the National Labor Relations Board must be 
sustained if there is substantial evidence on the record con-
sidered as a whole to support the findings of that Board. 
Thus, the rule to be applied there was the one imposed by 
federal statute rather than the rule of the Con1mon Law. 
This does not detract in any measure from the general 
proposition that when different inferences may be drawn 
from the same set of circumstances, it is the dutv of the 
trial court to presume in favor of innocent condu~t rather 
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than in favor of intentional and guilty misconduct. See 
,','tate v. J/usser, Utah, 175 P. 2d 724, Syllabus 25. 
REPLY TO PLAINTIFFS' POINT III 
At page 62 of the plaintiffs' brief, they state as a gen-
eral proposition that an award of punitive damages may 
be made by the judge where the factual issues are tried by 
him. Neither the weight of authorities nor those cited by 
plaintiffs support this proposition. The plaintiffs have 
really cited authorities for the limited proposition that in 
an action at law for money damages only when the parties 
expressly waive their rights to trial by jury a court may 
make any damage awards the jury might have made. This 
is wholly inapposite to the present case where Nance sued 
for a write of mandamus and Hanley sued for a mandatory 
injunction, and both sought damages as relief incidental to 
the primary prayer for reinstatement to membership in the 
uniOn. 
Thus, Calvat v. Franklin, 990 Colo. 444, 9 P. 2d 1061, 
inYolves an action at law in which both parties expressly 
waived a trial by jury. At page 1063, the court held: 
"If it [the court] may award actual damages, and 
if, as the [statute] provides an award of exemplary 
damages may be made in addition to an award for ac-
tual dan1ages, a court also has the power, when the 
parties themselves waive a jury and ask the court to 
try such issues, to award exemplary damages.'' 
All this case holds is that it is the waiver of the jury trial 
by the parties which clothed the trial court with authority 
to award exemplary damages. 
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Pure Oil Co. v. Quarles, 183 Okla. 418, 82 P. 2d 970, is 
an action at law for polution damages to a stream in which 
the parties also waived a jury. At page 975, that court 
holds: 
"We may say here, that we are unable to ~ind 
merit in the defendants' contention that only a JUry 
may, under this statute, award exemplary damages; 
that the court in a tort action where jury is waived is 
unauthorized to do so. In such case, the court in all re-
spects exercises the function of the jury, and its find-
ings have the force and effect of a jury verdict. [ Cita-
tions] Although we held in ~Ed Continent Petroleum 
Corp. v. Bettis, 180 Okla. 193, 69 P. 2d 346, that the 
court in an equity case, tried without jury, may not 
render judgment for exemplary damages, we there 
recognized the power of the court to do so in tort ac-
tions where jury is waived.'' 
Pickwick Stages v. Board of Trustees of tlle City of 
El Paso De Robles, 54 Cal. App. 730, 215 Pac. 558, is an-
other exan1ple of an action at law for money damages only 
which was tried to the court. 
Not only do these cases fail to support the proposition 
for which plaintiffs cite them, they manifestly support our 
position (stated at pages 51-53, opening brief) to the effect 
that a court in mandamus or equitable proceedings may not 
award exemplary damages. 
The plaintiff, moreover, at pages 63 and 64 of their 
brief evidently contend that the trial court was entitled to. 
disregard the verdict of the jury that no actual damages 
were suffered as a result of plaintiffs' expulsions and to 
award nominal damages. This amounts to an argument 
that the court in fact granted the plaintiffs a judg1nent 
10 
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notwithstanding the verdict. The contrary is true, of 
course, and the judge expressly denied plaintiffs' motion 
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict at the same time 
it denied their motion for a new trial. 
\V e think the glaring weakness in plaintiffs' argument 
that there is a right to recovery of exemplary damages in 
the circumstances is found at page 65 of their brief. There, 
the most that they can state is that in a proceeding such as 
this, damages resembling exemplary damages, such as dam-
ages for mental suffering, humiliation, et cetera, are clear-
ly recoverable. Damages" resembling" exemplary damag-
es are still not exemplary damages any more than one iden-
tical twin, who resembles the other, is the other. We stress 
the fact that they do not site a single case in which an ex-
pelled union member proceeding in mandamus or in equity 
for reinstatement to union membership and damages has 
been 1awarded exemplary damages. vV e know of no such 
case either. Damages for mental suffering, humiliation, 
etcetera, such as were allowed in the case of Nissen v. In-
ternational Brotherhood, 229 Iowa 1028, 295 N. W. 858, 141 
ALR 598, were compensatory in nature rather than ex-
emplary. See 15 Am. J ur. 595, where the text reads: 
''Damages for mental suffering are generally re-
garded as being actual or compensatory in character, 
and not as vindictive or punitive * * *. '' 
See also, 15 Am. J ur. 603, where it is said: 
"l\fental suffering consisting in a sense of insult, 
indignity, or humiliation or an injun~ to the feelings 
which accompanies or follows a physical act injury or 
which is caused by a wanton, intentional, or malicious 
act is generally considered to be a proper element of 
compensatory damages in an action brought to recov-
11 
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er for such physical injury or such wanton, intention, 
or malicious act.'' 
The plaintiffs contend at page 69 of their brief that the 
case of Martin v. Curran, 303 N.Y. 276, 101 N.E. 2d 683, 
which we cited at page 57 of our opening brief has been 
overruled in the later New York decision of Madden v. At-
kins, 4 N.Y. 2d 283, 151 N.E. 2d 73. We dispute this. We 
call attention to the fact that Martin v. Curran, supra, was 
cited in support of the proposition that a labor union should 
not be held liable in exemplary damages for malicious acts 
of some of its officers or members unless it can be shown 
that such acts were known to and ratified or approved in 
some manner by the labor organization, i.e. the member-
ship as a whole. Martin v. Curran, supra, involved an ac-
tion for libel, a cause of action in which malice is an essen-
tial ingredient. The Court of Appeals in Jiartin v. Curran 
refused to hold the labor organization liable in damages 
for the m1alicious publication because there was no showing 
that the union membership as a whole approved or sanc-
tioned the same. 
The case of Madden v. Atkins, supra, on the other 
hand, is simply an action for reinstatement to membership 
and actual compensatory damages suffered as a re8ult of 
a wrongful expulsion. The New York Court of ~lppeals in 
Madden v. Atkins, supra, concluded that it \Yas not neces-
sary in order to hold the labor organization liable for com-
pensatory damages proximatel~T caused b~~ the wrongful 
expulsion to prove that the membership as a whole approv-
ed or ratified the expulsion. The question of exemplary 
damages was- never raised nor discussed by the court in 
Jf add en v. Atkins, supra, and the case does not impair the 
soundness of the .Zllartin r. Curran proposition that liability 
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which is founded upon malicious conduct will not be imput-
ed to a labor organization unless the malice was known to 
and ratified by the membership as a whole. 
At page 7 4 of plaintiffs' brief, they state: "The dam-
ages suffered by plaintiffs were great and extensive. Their 
loss of earnings alone exceeded the amount of punitive 
damages awarded. In addition, they suffered humiliation 
by being branded as expelled members.'' These are the 
very issues that were submitted to the jury, and plaintiffs 
are simply disagreeing with the jury's verdict. The trial 
court upheld the verdict of the jury and denied their mo-
tions for judgment n.o.v. and a new trial, and consequently, 
these jury findings are res adjudicata. 
ANSWER TO POINT VII 
PLAINTIFFS' CROSS APPEAL 
Under Point VII of their brief, plaintiffs make their 
argument in support of the points raised on their cross ap-
peal. The plaintiffs have apparently withdrawn one of 
their grounds on cross appeal, namely; that the court erred 
in denying their motion for judgment nothwithstanding the 
verdict. (See Statement of Points on Cross Appeal, R. 692.) 
It will not be necessary, therefore, to discuss that ground. 
Earlier, counsel for the plaintiffs represented to this 
court in a memorandum in support of their Motion for Re-
consideration of Motion to Settle the Record that they did 
not intend to rely on any of the transcript evidence in sup-
port of their cross appeal, but would limit themselves to 
an argument that the court's factual determination and 
its conclusions entitled them, as a matter of law, to a new 
13 
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trial. At page 6 of the memorandum mentioned above, 
they stated: 
"Insofar as [plaintiffs'] cross appeal is concern-
ed, we intend to urge only that having found t~at the 
jury's verdict was against the weight of the evidence, 
the trial court committed reversible error in failing to 
grant a new trial. No transcript of the evidence is nec-
essary to sustain this position.'' 
A careful reading of plaintiffs' argument under Point 
VII leads us to conclude that plaintiffs have, in fact~on­
ored the represent,ation that they did not intend t~ at 
all upon any evidence contained in the transcript of the 
trial to the jury in support of the contention that the court 
erred in denying their motion for a nmY trial. It would ap-
pear they have thus limited themselves to the court's Find-
ings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment. 
We must then appraise the arguments contained in 
Poinf VII of their brief in the light of Utah law, under 
which the granting or denying of a motion for new trial is 
a matter that rests in the sound discretion of the trial 
court. In Utah, the granting or denying of a motion for 
new trial will not be disturbed upon review except in cir-
cumstances when the ~action of the trial court can be said 
to constitute an abuse of discretion. 
The plaintiffs, at pages 85 through 87 of their brief, 
set out in full findings of fact Nos. 17 (a) through 17 (i) 
contained in the order denying plaintiffs' motions for 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for a new trial. 
It is evidently on the strength of these findings that they 
conclude that the court had the dnt~~ under the law to grant 
their motion for a new trial, and that its refusal to do so 
was error. 
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This argument is not tenable. \rhat the plaintiffs have 
done is quote some of the court's findings of fact, while 
omitting others, so that the facts which they have recited in 
their brief are, in effect, quoted out of context. Thus, the 
plaintiffs have quite conveniently ignored finding of fact 
No. 18, which follows i1nmediately after finding of fact 
No. 17 ( i), wherein Judge Hoyt further found: 
''That there was irreconcilable conflict in the tes-
timony of witnesses as to the foregoing matters and 
particularly as to whether the so-called referral sys-
tem continued to be used by local union officers of the 
respondent association. That there was much testi-
mony on the part of witnesses on each side which the 
court believes was false and evasive regarding this and 
other matters above-mentioned. That respondent fail-
ed to call as witnesses the business agent of its Las 
Vegas Local or its International Representative for 
the Nevada area. That it appears reasonable to be-
lieve that these two union officers should have known 
better than any other witnesses called by respondent 
whether the referral system continued to be used in 
the Las Vegas area and whether or not the petitioner 
and intervenor were or were not denied work refer-
rals.'' 
When finding· of fact No. 18 is considered in juxtaposition 
with findings of fact Nos. 17 (a) through 17 (i), it becomes 
evident that Judge Hoyt conceded that irreconcilable con-
flict existed as to every material issue in the case. He was 
unable to resolve these conflicts and, moreover, he could 
not even determine whether the witnesses called b~~ the 
plaintiffs or those called by the defendant were testifying 
truthfully. With the record in this state, it seems utterly 
inconceivable to contend that the trial court's denial of 
plaintiffs' motion for a new trial amounted to an abuse of 
discretion. 
15 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
It is quite clear that for the plaintiffs to succeed under 
Utah law on the ground that the evidence is insufficient 
to justify the verdict, considerably more must be shown 
than that the trial court, upon its view of the evidence, is 
inclined to disagree with the verdict of the jury. Even 
under general principels of law, such ,a disagreement or dis-
satisfaction with a jury's verdict should not induce the trial 
court to grant a new trial. Thus, at 39 Am. Jur. 139, Sec-
tion 129, the text states: 
"* * * Under a statute authorizing the granting of a 
new trial where the verdict is not sust,ained by suffi-
cient evidence, a new trial may be granted though the 
evidence was sufficient to take the case to the jury. It 
is not, however, a sufficient ground for a new trial 
that the verdict is merely contrary to what appears to 
be a preponderance of the testimony, or that the court, 
acting as trier of the facts, would have arrived at a 
conclusion opposed to that of the jury. It has been 
said that the only question before the court is whether 
the evidence was so overwhelmingly in favor of the de-
fendant that a 'Terdict for the pl,aintiff can only be ex-
plained on the ground of prejudice, partiality, cor-
ruption, or mistake. * * * '' 
The Utah cases are in accord with the proposition quoted 
above. 
In Valiotis v. Utah-Apex Jfining Co., 55 Utah 151, 184 
Pac. 802, in determining -whether the trial court had proper-
ly exercised its discretion in denying a motion for a new 
trial, this court held : 
"This court has repeatedly held that the discre-
tion of the trial court exercised in granting or refus-
ing to grant a motion for a new trial based on the in-
sufficiency of the ev~dence to justif~T _the verdict can-
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not be inh,rfered with when, upon examination of the 
evidence as disclosed by the record, it is apparent that 
there is a substantial conflict of evidence as to ma-
terial issues of fact in the case relative to which the 
insufficiency is alleged.'' 
In Vaiiotis, the ground relied upon was, "that the verdict 
was against the weight of the evidence", and this court 
clearly held that such was not a proper ground upon which 
to base an order granting a new trial. 
In Uptown Appliance & Radio Co. v. Flint, Utah, 29 P. 
2d 826, this court stated at page 829: 
"Jury trials are a part of the fundamental tenets 
of our judicial system and where, as in this case a 
litigant has fully, completely and without restraint 
been permitted to show his full grievance to a jury 
~and they have conscientiously and without any show-
ing of prejudice or other extraneous influences de-
cided the matter there must be some basic and com-
pelling reason so inherent in the evidence that the trial 
judge would be warranted in placing his judgment as 
to the result to be reached over and above that of the 
jury. 
" 'A court, vacating a verdict and granting a new 
trial by merely setting up his opinion or judgment 
against that of the jury, but usurps judicial power and 
prostitutes the constitutional trial by jury.' Jensen v. 
Denver & Rio Grande Railroad Company, 44 Utah 100, 
138 P. 1185, 1192. 
"The result reached by the jury in this case seems 
to be in ·accordance with the evidence produced. 
''This being the state of the evidence we believe, 
and so hold, that an order to retry this rna tter is not 
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warranted and to that extent is an abuse of discretion 
upon the part of the trial judge.'' 
In Holmes v. Nelson, Utah, 326 P. 2d 722 at page 726, 
Justice Crockett, concurring, wrote: 
''If the trial court is to fulfill his function of main-
taining general supervision over litigation to see that 
justice is done, it is necessary that he have the power 
to set aside verdicts and grant new trials when the 
objective is not served. But such prerogative should 
be exercised with caution and forbearance consistent 
with his important and imperative duty to safeguard 
the right of trial by jury. The verdict, when support-
ed by substantial evidence, should be regarded as pre-
sumptively correct and should not be interfered with 
merely because the judge might disagree with the re-
sult. The prerogative should only be exercised when, 
in the view of the trial court, it seems clear that the 
·jury has misapplied or failed to take into account 
proven facts ; or misunderstood or disregarded the 
law; or made findings clearly against the weight of 
evidence so that the verdict is offensive to his sense 
of justice to the extent that he cannot in good con-
science permit it to stand." 
The Florida decision, Gulf Power Co. l'. Bagby, 113 
Fla. 739, 152 So. 23, cited at page 88 of the plaintiffs' brief 
is not good law in Utah, and it appears to be one of the 
cases decided under the ''thirteenth juror'' concept, under 
which theory the trial court acts as the final, or thirteenth, 
juror and is placed under an affirmative dut~T to set aside 
the verdict any time the verdict does not coincide ·with its 
own analysis or apprais,al of the evidence. This concept, 
as Justice Crockett pointed out in his concurring opinion 
in Holmes v. Nelson, supra, has never prevailed in r tah. 
In view of the law of Utah and the fact that the con-
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flicting evidence on the material issues was in the opinion 
of the trial court irreconcilable, it is clear beyond perad-
venture that the denial of the plaintiffs' motion for a new 
trial was a proper exercise of judicial discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
'Ve respectfully submit that the matters raised by 
plaintiffs as an answer to the points discussed in our open-
ing brief in support of our appeal lack merit, and that de-
fendant union is entitled to a reversal of the judgment of 
the court below on the issues of the alleged wrongful ex-
pulsion, exemplary damages, attorneys fees, and court 
costs. The plaintiffs, moreover, have failed to show that 
the trial court erred in denying their motion for a new trial 
in connection with the damage issues tried before the jnr~r, 
and, accordingly, their cross appeal should be denied. 
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